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Honor Langdell
William P. LaPiana
Paul Carrington's article on the influence of Christopher Columbus
Langdell and his work falls into two parts. One is a celebration of what is
good and useful and true in the case method of studying law. The other is a
history of Langdell's creation of that method of teaching and a criticism of
the first Dean of Harvard Law School for allegedly separating law from poli-
tics, destroying an older tradition of American law teaching in which the
inculcation of public virtue played an important role and hence addling
the minds of generations yet to born. Professor Carrington's observations of
the effect of the case method are interesting and certainly suggestive. They
provide law teachers with important material for thought about what it is
we are doing in the classroom. His history, however, is a forensic history,
designed, like so much of the history written by lawyers, to prove a point.'
Carrington's version is different from that generally received; he rescues
Langdell's Harvard colleagues James Bradley Thayer, John Chipman Gray,
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., from the obloquy heaped on them, but for
him Langdell is still thoroughly, profoundly, and obstinately wrong.
I disagree, and in this brief reply, I suggest that Langdell was far more
sophisticated than is often believed. His method of teaching and of studying
law was solidly rooted in contemporary Anglo-American legal thought and
represented what most of us living in the late 20th century would regard as
an important advance on what went before. Finally, I also suggest that the
very aspect of Langdell's thought which is so often criticized not only influ-
enced the great American judges of the early and mid-20th century but also
contains a deep moral lesson for modem American lawyers and law teach-
ers. Indeed, I, too, hail Langdell, but for different reasons.
William P. LaPiana is the Rita & Joseph Solomon Professor of Wills, Trusts & Estates at
the New York Law School.
1. Forensic history has been of great importance in American history. John Phillip Reid
has described the legal arguments of the Revolutionary generation as a forensic history. See,
for example, John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority
of Rights (Madison, Wis., 1986).
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What made Langdell's approach to the study and teaching of law "sci-
entific" was the primacy given to original sources, which for Langdell and
his colleagues were the decided cases of the courts. Such an approach was
scientific because it refused to deduce the law from the then reigning a
priori assumptions about the way the world works. It is true that Langdell
seems to have had firm opinions about what the investigation of the sources
should reveal about the workings of private law, but he did not believe that
those workings were dictated by anything more exalted than the common
law's blending of rights and remedies, expressed in the complications of the
writ system.
2
Langdel's scholarship and teaching were also scientific because they
were historical. As Thayer wrote, Langdell's great contribution was to bring
to legal education what good lawyers always do: study cases to understand
the development of principles.3 Thayer and Gray investigated the historical
progression of cases to make their points about the state of the law, Thayer
in evidence and Gray in property. For example, while Gray does admit that
his dislike of spendthrift trusts is based on his disapproval of what he calls
paternalism, his analysis of the invalidity of restraints on alienation is based
on close analysis of the important cases to show that this judge-made law is
bad law.a
Both these aspects of Langdell's thought, which, I believe, are thor-
oughly characteristic of academic thought of his age, are, in the end, secu-
lar. In contrast, what went before, in the period before the Civil War, was
profoundly sacral. If one can identify a single problem in our modem under-
standing of American law in the first half of the 19th century, it is our
inability to take seriously the proposition that Protestant Christianity was
the strongest cultural force in the nation. Whatever ideas the legal profes-
sion had about the sources of public law and the nature of the Constitution,
there was widespread agreement that the principles of private law were con-
gruent with and dictated by the absolutely true requirements of Christian
morality. Law was principles, and properly decided cases reflected those
principles, which themselves, in the end, were God's plan for governing the
nation. While the cultural strength of this view began to ebb in the 1850s,
the horror of the Civil War and the bungled mess of Reconstruction finally
2. For an excellent explanation of the relationship between common law jurisprudence
and the writ system, see Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence,
1760-1850 (Oxford, 1991), esp. ch. 9.
3. William P. LaPiana, Logic and Experience, The Origin of Modem American Legal Educa-
tion 103 (New York, 1994). In the preface to his casebook on constitutional law, Thayer
elaborated on the relationship between and science, identifying the case method as one exam-
ple of "what scientific men call the genetic method of study which allows one to see the topic
grow and develop under his eye,-a thing always grateful and stimulating to the human facul-
ties, as if they were called home to some native and congenial field." 1 J. B. Thayer, Cases on
Constitutional Law v-vi (2 vols. Cambridge, Mass., 1895).
4. LaPiana, Logic and Experience 127-28.
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seem to have ended the reign of religiously based morality in law and poli-
tics, at least for people like Holmes, Langdell, and even Thayer and Gray.
Langdell did not reject politics; he rejected in the study of law the easy
appeal to what was assumed to be right. In its place he put legal science as
he understood it. To us that science may look like a naive attempt to substi-
tute professional neutrality for inevitable political choices, but there is evi-
dence that Langdell had strong opinions about what we would call "policy."
The best example is his approach to antitrust questions. At first glance,
Langdell's article on the Northern Securities Case is the paradigm of Langdel-
lian foolishness. 5 The decree of the Circuit Court breaking up the holding
company, he writes, is insupportable because it is unsanctioned by the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act. What else would one expect from a scholar who spent
untold hours and numerous pages of the Harvard Law Review investigating
equity jurisdiction as a historical matter. Those expectations, however, are
far too timid. Langdell went on to analyze the application of the Sherman
Act to the problem of railway competition. Because price competition in
rail transportation is inevitably ruinous for the railroads involved, the only
cure is government regulation of rates or outright government ownership.
Clearly, Langdell had strong opinions on important public issues. He be-
lieved, however, that his law school (and perhaps other schools with the
same demanding standards) couldnot teach what was relevant to solving
many of those problems without slighting the all important goal of advanc-
ing legal science. Langdell's legal education was designed to train lawyers,
not administrators or bureaucrats, and especially not "leaders" of the polity.
Such an approach to legal education could turn students into unre-
flecting defenders of the status quo. I believe, however, that it had the op-
posite effect. By making the mastery of legal science the hallmark of
professional competency and prestige, case method education gave lawyers a
claim to social position and power based less on the defense of certain ideas
about society and government than on apparently apolitical expertise. This
modest approach to legal education may have helped to put the nails in the
coffin of substantive due process. All lawyers know is what judges decide,
and what judges decide is law because the power of the state enforces it.
What lawyers, and judges, are expert in is the intricate system of interre-
lated rights and remedies known as the common law. They are not expert in
the proper organization of society. Langdell could easily imagine govern-
ment ownership of the railways as the best solution to a problem created by
economic facts; such a mind seems unlikely to approve decisions made in
the name of "freedom of contract" which appeared nowhere in the Consti-
tution but drew its power from some realm of ultimate right. Thayer's fa-
mous views on the limited nature of judicial review may also be related to
5. C. C. Langdell, "The Northern Securities Case and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act," 16
Harv. L. Rev. 539 (1903).
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this modest view of lawyering and judging. More important, the lesson took
with their students. Learned Hand excoriated substantive due process and
proudly presented himself as a craftsman, devoted principally to refining
and defending legal science. 6
Langdell's vision of legal education is narrow, perhaps, but its very lim-
itations may have contributed to the birth of what we recognize as modem
American legal culture. One of the great themes of that culture (at least
until recently) is judicial deference to legislative policy judgment. Langdell
and his colleagues helped to create a legal profession which could live with
such an arrangement by separating professional status from specific political
positions. Such a role may not be as satisfying at the end of the 20th century
as it was in its middle. In today's legal culture, Langdell has become the
ghost at the banquet, reminding us of how little we really know, and how
difficult it is to master the law, let alone law and some other discipline or
aspect of policy making. Langdell be praised, for he tells us how difficult is
the task of being a lawyer in a democratic society.
6. William P. LaPiana, "Thoughts and Lives," 37 New York L. School L. Rev. 607 (1994).
